FUSE: Lightweight Guaranteed Distributed Failure Notification

FUSE: Lightweight Guaranteed Distributed Failure Notification

John Dunagan∗ Nicholas J. A. Harvey‡ Michael B. Jones∗ Dejan Kostić†

Marvin Theimer∗ Alec Wolman∗

“I am not discouraged, because every failure is another step forward.” – Thomas Edison

Abstract

FUSE is a lightweight failure notification service for building distributed systems. Distributed systems built with FUSE are guaranteed that failure notifications never fail. Whenever a failure notification is triggered, all live members of the FUSE group will hear a notifica- tion within a bounded period of time, irrespective of node or communication failures. In contrast to previous work on failure detection, the responsibility for deciding that a failure has occurred is shared between the FUSE service and the distributed application. This allows applications to implement their own definitions of failure. Our expe- rience building a scalable distributed event delivery sys- tem on an overlay network has convinced us of the use- fulness of this service. Our results demonstrate that the network costs of each FUSE group can be small; in par- ticular, our overlay network implementation requires no additional liveness-verifying ping traffic beyond that al- ready needed to maintain the overlay, making the steady state network load independent of the number of active FUSE groups.

1 Introduction

This paper describes FUSE, a lightweight failure noti- fication service. When building distributed systems, man- aging failures is an important and often complex task. Many different architectures, abstractions, and services have been proposed to address this [5, 10, 13, 28, 30, 38, 42, 43, 44]. FUSE provides a new programming model for failure management that simplifies the task of agree- ing when failures have occurred in a distributed system, thereby reducing the complexity faced by application de- velopers. The most closely related prior work on coping with failures has centered around failure detection ser- vices. FUSE takes a somewhat different approach, where

∗Microsoft Research, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA. {jdunagan, mbj, theimer, alecw}@microsoft.com

†Department of Computer Science, Duke University, Durham, NC. dkostic@cs.duke.edu

‡Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Mas- sachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. nickh@mit.edu

detecting failures is a shared responsibility between FUSE and the application. Applications create a FUSE group with an immutable list of participants. FUSE monitors this group until either FUSE or the application decides to terminate the group, at which point all live participants are guaranteed to learn of a “group failure” within a bounded period of time. This focus on delivering failure notifica- tions leads us to refer to FUSE as a failure notification service. This is a very different approach than prior sys- tems have adopted, and we will argue that it is a good approach for wide-area Internet applications.

Applications make use of the FUSE abstraction as fol- lows: the application asks FUSE to create a new group, specifying the other participating nodes. When FUSE fin- ishes constructing the group, it returns a unique identifier for this group to the creator. The application then passes this FUSE ID to the applications on all the other nodes in this group, each of which registers a callback associ- ated with the given FUSE ID. FUSE guarantees that every group member will be reliably notified via this callback whenever a failure condition affects the group. This fail- ure notification may be triggered either explicitly, by the application, or implicitly, when FUSE detects that com- munication among group members is impaired.

Applications can create multiple FUSE groups for dif- ferent purposes, even if those FUSE groups span the same set of nodes. In the event that FUSE detects a low-level communication failure, failure will be signalled on all the FUSE groups using that path. However, on any individual FUSE group the application may signal a failure without affecting any of the other groups.

FUSE provides the guarantee that notifications will be delivered within a bounded period of time, even in the face of node crashes and arbitrary network failures. We refer to these semantics as “distributed one-way agree- ment”. One-way refers to the fact that there is only one transition any group member can see: from “live” to “failed”. After failure notification on a group, detecting future failures requires creating a new group.

By providing these semantics, FUSE ensures that fail- ure notifications never fail. This greatly simplifies failure handling among nodes that have state that they want to handle in a coordinated fashion. FUSE efficiently handles all the corner cases of guaranteeing that all members will be notified of any failure condition affecting the group. Applications built on top of FUSE do not need to worry

 

 

that a failure message did not get through or that orphaned state remains in the system.

The primary target for FUSE is wide-area Internet ap- plications, such as content delivery networks, peer-to-peer applications, web services, and grid computing. FUSE is not targeted at applications that require strong consis- tency on replicated data, such as stock exchanges and missile control systems. Techniques such as virtual syn- chrony [6], Paxos [29], and BFT [10] have already proven to be effective in such environments. However, these tech- niques incur significant overhead and therefore have lim- ited scalability. Furthermore, FUSE does not provide re- silience to malicious participants, though it also does not preclude solving this problem at a higher layer.

Previous work on failure detection services uses “membership” as the fundamental abstraction: these ser- vices typically provide a list of each component in the system, and whether it is currently up or down. Member- ship services have seen widespread success as a building block for implementing higher level distributed services, such as consensus, and have even been deployed in such commercially important systems as the New York Stock Exchange [5]. However, one disadvantage of the mem- bership abstraction is that it does not allow application components to have failed with respect to one action, but not with respect to another. For example, suppose a node is engaged in an operation with a peer and at some point fails to receive a timely response. The failure manage- ment service should support declaring that this operation has failed without requiring that a node or process be de- clared to have failed. The FUSE abstraction provides this flexibility: FUSE tracks whether individual application communication paths are currently working in a manner that is acceptable to the application.

The scenario described above is more likely to oc- cur with wide-area Internet applications, which face a demanding operating environment: network congestion leads to variations in network loss rate and delay; intran- sitive connectivity failures (sometimes called partial con- nectivity failures) occur due to router or firewall miscon- figuration [27, 31]; and individuals network components such as links and routers can also fail. Under these con- ditions, it is difficult for applications to make good deci- sions based solely on the information provided by a mem- bership service. A particular scenario illustrating why applications need to participate in deciding when failure has occurred is delivery of streaming content over the In- ternet: failure to achieve a certain threshold bandwidth may be unacceptable to such an application even though other applications are perfectly happy with the connectiv- ity provided by that same network path.

Our FUSE implementation is scalable, where scaling is with respect to the number of groups: multiple failure notification groups can share liveness checking messages. Other implementations of the FUSE abstraction may sac- rifice scalability in favor of increased security. Our FUSE implementation is designed to support large numbers of

small to moderate size groups. We do not attempt to effi- ciently support very large groups because we believe very large groups will tend to suffer from too-frequent failure notification, making them less useful.

Our FUSE implementation is particularly well-suited to applications using scalable overlay networks. Scalable overlay networks already do liveness checking to main- tain their routing tables and FUSE can re-use this live- ness checking traffic. In such a deployment, the network traffic required to implement FUSE is independent of the number of groups until a failure occurs; only creation and teardown of a group introduce a per-group overhead. FUSE can be implemented in the absence of a pre-existing overlay network – the implementation can construct its own overlay, or it can use an alternative liveness checking topology.

We have implemented FUSE on top of the Skip- Net [25] scalable overlay network, and we have built a scalable event delivery application using FUSE. We eval- uated our implementation using two main techniques: a discrete event simulator to evaluate its scalability, and a live system with 400 overlay participants (each running in its own process) running on a cluster of 40 worksta- tions to evaluate correctness and performance. Both the simulator and the live system use an identical code base except for the base messaging layer. Our live system eval- uation shows that our FUSE implementation is indeed lightweight; the latency of FUSE group creation is the la- tency of an RPC call to the furthest group member; the la- tency of explicit failure notification is similarly dominated by network latency; and we show that our implementation is robust to false positives caused by network packet loss.

In summary, the key contributions of this paper are:

• We present a novel abstraction, the FUSE failure notifi- cation group, that provides the semantics of distributed one-way agreement. These are desirable semantics in our chosen setting of wide-area Internet applications.

• We used FUSE in building a scalable event delivery ser- vice and we describe how it significantly reduced the complexity of this task.

• We implemented FUSE on top of a scalable overlay net- work. This allowed us to support FUSE without adding additional liveness checking. We experimentally eval- uated the performance of our implementation on a live system with 400 virtual nodes.

2 Related Work

Failure detection has been the subject of more than two decades of research. This work can be broadly classified into unreliable failure detectors, weakly consistent mem- bership services, and strongly consistent membership ser- vices. Unreliable failure detectors provide the weakest semantics directly, but they are a standard building block in constructing membership services with stronger se- mantics. Both weakly-consistent and strongly-consistent

 

 

membership services are based on the abstraction of a list of available or unavailable components (typically pro- cesses or machines). In contrast, a FUSE group ID is not bound to a process or machine and hence can be used in many contexts. For example, it can correspond to a set of several processes, or to related data stored on several different machines. This abstraction allows FUSE to pro- vide novel semantics for distributed agreement, a subject we will elaborate on in our discussion of weakly consis- tent membership services.

Chandra et al. formalized the concept of unreliable failure detectors, and showed that one such detector was the weakest failure detector for solving consensus [11, 12]. Such detectors typically provide periodic heartbeat- ing and callbacks saying whether the component is “re- sponding” or “not responding.” These callbacks may be aggregate judgments based on sets of pings. Unreliable failure detectors provide the following semantic guaran- tee: fail-stop crashes will be identified as such within a bounded amount of time. There has been extensive work on such detectors, focusing on such aspects as interface design, scalability, rapidity of failure detection, and mini- mizing network load [1, 17, 21, 23, 38].

FUSE uses a similar lightweight mechanism (periodic heartbeats) to unreliable failure detectors, but provides stronger distributed agreement semantics. Unreliable fail- ure detectors are typically used as a component in a mem- bership service, and the membership service is responsi- ble for implementing distributed agreement semantics.

Weakly consistent membership services have also been the subject of an extensive body of work [2, 19, 42, 44]. This work can be broadly classified as differing in speed of failure detection, accuracy (low rate of false positives), message load, and completeness (failed nodes are agreed to have failed by everyone in the system). Epidemic and gossip-style algorithms have been used to build highly scalable implementations of this service [19, 42]. Pre- vious application areas that have been proposed for such membership services are distributed collaborative appli- cations, online games, large-scale publish-subscribe sys- tems, and multiple varieties of Web Services [5, 19]. These are the same application domains targeted by FUSE, and FUSE has similar overhead to a weakly con- sistent membership service in these settings. Typical char- acteristics of such applications are that many operations are idempotent or can be straightforwardly undone, oper- ations can be re-attempted with a different set of partici- pants, or the decision to retry can be deferred to the user (as in an instant messaging service).

One novel aspect of the FUSE abstraction is the ability to handle arbitrary network failures. In contrast, weakly consistent membership services provide semantic guaran- tees assuming only a fail-stop model. One kind of net- work failure where the FUSE abstraction is useful is an intransitive connectivity failure: A can reach B, B can reach C, but A cannot reach C. This class of network fail- ures is hard for a weakly consistent membership service to

handle because the abstraction of a membership list lim- its the service to one of three choices, each of which has drawbacks:

• Declare one of the nodes experiencing the intransitive connectivity failure to have failed. This prevents the use of that node by any node that can reach it.

• Declare all of the nodes experiencing the intransitive failure to be alive because other nodes in the system can reach them. This may cause the application to block for the duration of the connectivity failure.

• Allow a persistent inconsistency among different nodes’ views of the membership list. This forces the application to deal with inconsistency explicitly, and therefore the membership service is no longer reducing the complexity burden on the application developer.

FUSE appropriately handles intransitive connectivity failures by allowing the application on a node experienc- ing a failure to declare the corresponding FUSE group to have failed. Other FUSE groups involving the same node but not utilizing a failed communication path can continue to operate. Application participation is required to achieve this because FUSE may not have detected the failure itself; like most weakly consistent membership services, FUSE typically monitors only a subset of all application-level communication paths.

FUSE would require application involvement in failure detection even if it monitored all communication paths. Consider a multi-tier service composed of a front-end, middle-tier, and back-end. Suppose the middle-tier com- ponent is available but misconfigured. FUSE allows the front-end to declare a failure, and to then perform appro- priate failure recovery, such as finding another middle-tier from some pool of available machines. This difference in usage between membership services and FUSE reflects a difference in philosophy. Membership services try to proactively decide at a system level whether or not nodes and processes are available. FUSE provides a mecha- nism that applications can use to declare failures when application-level constraints (such as configuration) are violated.

Another contrast between the two approaches is that the FUSE abstraction enables “fate-sharing” among dis- tributed data items. By associating these items with a sin- gle FUSE group, application developers can enforce that invalidating any one item will cause all the remaining data items to be invalidated. Weakly consistent membership services do not explicitly provide this tying together of distributed data.

Strongly consistent membership services share the ab- straction of a membership list, but they also guarantee that all nodes in the system always see a consistent list through the use of atomic updates. Such membership services are an important component in building highly available and reliable systems using virtual synchrony. Notable exam- ples of systems built using this approach are the New York

 

 

and Swiss Stock Exchanges, the French Air Traffic Con- trol System, and the AEGIS Warship [2, 5, 6]. However, a limitation of virtual synchrony is that it has only been shown to perform well at small scales, such as five node systems [6].

Some network routing protocols, such as IS-IS [8], OSPF [33], and AutoNet [35], use mechanisms simi- lar to FUSE. One similar aspect of AutoNet is its use of teardown and recreate to manage failures. Any link- state change causes all AutoNet switches to discard their link-state databases and rebuild the global routing table. OSPF and IS-IS take local link observations and prop- agate them throughout the network using link-state an- nouncements. They tolerate arbitrary network failures using timers and explicit refreshes to maintain the link- state databases. FUSE also uses timers and keep-alives to tolerate arbitrary network failures. However, FUSE uses them to tie together sets of links that provide end-to-end connectivity between group members, and to provide an overall yes/no decision for whether connectivity is satis- factory.

A more distantly related area of prior work is black- box techniques for diagnosing failures. Such techniques use statistics or machine learning to distinguish successful and failed requests [9, 13, 14, 15, 16]. In contrast, FUSE assumes application developer participation and provides semantic guarantees to the developer. Another significant distinction is that black-box techniques typically require data aggregation in a central location for analysis; FUSE has no such requirement.

Distributed transactions are a well-known abstrac- tion for simplifying distributed systems. Because FUSE provides weaker semantics than distributed transactions, FUSE can maintain its semantic guarantees under net- work failures that cause distributed transactions to block. Theoretical results on consensus show that the possibility of blocking is fundamental to any protocol for distributed transactions [22, 24].

Two of the design choices we made in building FUSE were also recommended by recent works dealing with the architectural design of network protocols. Ji et al. [26] surveyed hard-state and soft-state signaling mechanisms across a broad class of network protocols, and recom- mended a soft state approach combining timers with ex- plicit revocation: FUSE does this. Mogul et al. [32] ar- gued that state maintained by network protocol imple- mentations should be exposed to clients of those proto- cols. As described in Section 6, we modified our overlay routing layer to expose a mechanism for FUSE to piggy- back content on overlay maintenance traffic.

3 FUSE Semantics and API

We begin by describing one simple approach to im- plementing the FUSE abstraction. Suppose every group member periodically pings every other group member with an “are you okay?” message. A group member that

is not okay for any reason, either because of node failure, network disconnect, network partition, or transient over- load, will fail to respond to some ping. The member that initiated this missed ping will ensure that a failure noti- fication propagates to the rest of the group by ceasing to respond itself to all pings for that FUSE group. Any in- dividual observation of a failure is thus converted into a group failure notification. This mechanism allows failure notifications to be delivered despite any pattern of discon- nections, partitions, or node failures. This specific FUSE implementation guarantees that failure notifications are propagated to every party within twice the periodic ping- ing interval. Our implementation uses a different liveness checking topology, discussed in Section 5. It also uses a different ping retry policy; the retry policy and the guar- antees on failure notification latency are discussed in Sec- tion 3.3.

The name FUSE is derived from the analogy to “laying a fuse” between the group members. Whenever any group member wishes to signal failure it can light the fuse, and this failure notification will propagate to all other group members as the fuse burns. A connectivity failure or node crash at any intermediate location along the fuse will cause the fuse to be lit there as well, and the fuse will then start burning in every direction away from the failure. This ensures that communication failures will not stop the progress of the failure notification. Also, once the fuse has burnt, it cannot be relit, analogous to how the FUSE facility only notifies the application once per FUSE group.

Many different FUSE implementations are possible. All implementations of the FUSE abstraction must pro- vide distributed one-way agreement: failure notifica- tions are delivered to all live group members under node crashes and arbitrary network failures. Different FUSE implementations may use different strategies for group creation, liveness checking topology, retry, programming interface, and persistence, with consequent variations in performance. In this section, we describe the choices that we made in our FUSE implementation, the resulting se- mantics that application developers will need to under- stand, and some of the alternative strategies that other FUSE implementations could use.

3.1 Programming Interface

We now present the FUSE API for our implementation. FUSE groups are created by calling CreateGroup with a desired set of member nodes. This generates a FUSE ID unique to this group, communicates it to the FUSE layers on all the specified members, and then returns the ID to the caller. Applications are subsequently expected to ex- plicitly communicate the FUSE ID from the creator to the other group members. Applications learning about this FUSE ID register a handler for FUSE notifications us- ing the RegisterFailureHandler function. In this design, the FUSE layer is not responsible for communicating the FUSE ID to applications on nodes other than the creator.

 

 

// Creates a FUSE notification group containing // the nodes in the set FuseId CreateGroup(NodeId[] set)

// Registers a callback function to be invoked // when a notification occurs for the FUSE group void RegisterFailureHandler

(Callback handler, FuseId id)

// Allows the application to explicitly cause // FUSE failure notification void SignalFailure(FuseId id)

Figure 1. The FUSE API

We believe the most likely use of FUSE is to allow fate-sharing of distributed application state. Applications should learn about FUSE IDs with sufficient context to know what application state to associate with the FUSE ID. Though failure handlers can simply perform garbage collection of the associated application state, a handler is also free to attempt to re-establish the application state using a new FUSE group, or to execute arbitrary code. For brevity, we refer to all of these permissible application- level actions using the short-hand “garbage collection.”

The application handler is invoked whenever the FUSE layer believes a failure has occurred, either because of a node or communication failure or because the appli- cation explicitly signalled a failure event at one of the group members. If RegisterFailureHandler is called with a FUSE ID parameter that does not exist, perhaps because it has already been signalled, the handler callback is in- voked immediately. Applications that wish to explicitly signal failure do so by calling the SignalFailure function.

3.2 Group Creation

Group creation can be implemented in one of two ways: it can return immediately, or it can block until all nodes in the group have been contacted. Returning immediately reduces latency, but because FUSE has not checked that all group members are alive, the application may perform expensive operations, only to have FUSE signal failure a short time later. In contrast, blocking until all members have been contacted increases creation la- tency, but decreases the likelihood that the FUSE group will immediately fail. We chose to implement blocking create; this provides application developers the seman- tic guarantee that if group creation returns successfully, all the group members were alive and reachable. A high enough rate of churn amongst group members could re- peatedly prevent FUSE group creation from succeeding. However, based on the low latency of FUSE group cre- ation (Section 7), such a high churn rate is likely to cause the system to fail in other ways before FUSE becomes a bottleneck.

When CreateGroup is called, FUSE generates a glob- ally unique FUSE ID for the group. Each node is then contacted and asked to join the new FUSE group. If any group member is unreachable, all nodes that already learned of the new FUSE group are then notified of the failure. Group members that learned of the group but sub-

sequently become unreachable similarly detect the group failure through their inability to communicate with other group members. If the FUSE layer is successfully con- tacted on all members, the FUSE ID is returned to the CreateGroup caller.

FUSE state is never orphaned by failures, even when those failures occur just after group creation. An applica- tion may receive a FUSE ID from the group creator, and then attempt to associate a failure handler with this FUSE group, only to find out that the group no longer exists be- cause a failure has already been signalled. This causes the failure handler to be invoked, just as if the notification had arrived after the failure handler was registered.

3.3 Liveness Monitoring and Failure Notifica- tion

Once setup is complete, our FUSE implementation monitors the liveness of the group members using a span- ning tree whose individual branches follow the overlay routes between the group creator and the group members. Each link in the tree is monitored from both sides; if either side decides a link has failed, it ceases to acknowledge pings for the given FUSE group along all its links. When this occurs, one could immediately signal group failure, but our implementation instead attempts repair, as will be explained in more detail in Section 6.

This mechanism allows FUSE to guarantee that any member of the group can cause a failure notification to be received by every other live group member. FUSE in- vokes the failure notification handler exactly once on a node before tearing down the state for that FUSE group. A node hearing the notification does not know whether it was due to crash, network disconnect or partition, or if the notification was explicitly triggered by some group mem- ber. Explicit triggering is a necessary component of FUSE because FUSE does not guarantee that it will notice all persistent communication problems between group mem- bers automatically; it only guarantees that a communica- tion failure noticed by any group member will soon be detected by all group members.

FUSE only guarantees delivery of failure notifications, and only to nodes that have already been contacted during group creation. Note that FUSE clients cannot use this mechanism to implement general-purpose reliable com- munication. Therefore, well-known impossibility results for consensus do not apply to FUSE [22, 24]. A concrete example illustrating this limitation is a network partition. FUSE members on both sides of the partition will receive failure notifications, but it is not possible to communicate additional information, such as the cause of the failure, across the partition.

FUSE will sometimes generate a notification to the en- tire group even though all nodes are alive and the next at- tempted communication would succeed. We refer to such a notification as a false positive. It is easy to see how false positives can occur – transient communication fail- ures can trigger group notification. The possibility of false

 

 

positives is inherent in building distributed systems on top of unreliable infrastructure. One can tune the timeout and retry policy used by the liveness checking mechanism, but there is a fundamental tradeoff between the latency of fail- ure detection and the probability that timeouts generate false positives. We do not provide an API mechanism for applications to modify the FUSE timeout and retry pol- icy. Providing such a mechanism would add complexity to our implementation, while providing little benefit: ap- plications already need to implement their own timeouts, as dictated by their choice of transport layer. FUSE re- quires this participation from applications because FUSE does not necessarily monitor every link.

Because we implement liveness checking using over- lay routes, the maximum notification latency is propor- tional to the diameter of the overlay: successive failures at adversarially chosen times could cause each link to fail exactly one failure timeout after the previous link. How- ever, we expect notification after a failure to rarely require more than a single failure timeout interval because our FUSE implementation always attempts to aggressively propagate failure notifications. Also, application develop- ers do not need to know the maximum latency in order to specify their timeouts. As mentioned above, sends should be monitored using whatever timeout is appropriate to the transport layer used by the application. If the sender times out, it can signal the FUSE layer explicitly. If a node is waiting to receive a message, specifying a timeout is diffi- cult because only the sender knows when the transmission is initiated. In this case, if the sender has crashed, devel- opers should rely on the FUSE layer timeout to guarantee the failure handler will be called.

FUSE failure notifications do not necessarily eliminate all the race conditions that an application developer must handle. For example, one group member might signal a failure notification, and then initiate failure recovery by sending a message to another group member. This failure recovery message might arrive at the other group member before it receives the FUSE failure notification. In our experience, version-stamping the data associated with a FUSE group was a simple and effective means of handling these races.

3.4 Fail-on-Send

FUSE does not guarantee that all communication fail- ures between group members will be proactively detected. For example, in wireless networks sometimes link condi- tions will allow only small messages – such as liveness ping messages – to get through while larger messages cannot. In this case, the application will detect that the communication path is not working, and explicitly signal FUSE. We call this reason for explicitly signalling FUSE fail-on-send.

There are two categories of failures that require fail-on- send. The first is a communication path that successfully transmits FUSE liveness checking messages but which does not meet the needs of the application. The second

is a failed communication path the application is using, but which FUSE is not monitoring.

An example from this second category is an intransi- tive connectivity failure. If two applications cannot com- municate directly, but are both responding to FUSE mes- sages from a third party, they may only experience a fail- ure upon attempting to exchange a message. FUSE still guarantees that if either party triggers a notification at this point, all live group members will hear a notification.

Some applications may generate mixed acknowledged and un-acknowledged traffic. For example, an application might send streaming video over UDP alongside a control stream over TCP. In this case, it is up to the application to decide which delivery failures warrant a notification. Fail- on-send allows this failure case to be handled in the same manner as the previous cases.

3.5 Failure Model and Security

FUSE is designed to handle node crashes and arbitrary network failures, but not malicious behavior. The appli- cation we built using FUSE handles malicious behavior through redundancy above the FUSE layer by using mul- tiple content distribution trees (see Section 4).

FUSE assumes a network failure model consisting of any pattern of packet loss, duplication or re-ordering. This includes simultaneous network partitions and even an ad- versary dropping packets based on their content. For any network failure, FUSE guarantees that all parties agree whether or not a failure has occurred. Our FUSE im- plementation routes all FUSE and overlay messages over TCP connections. Our implementation handles arbitrary packet loss and re-ordering, but only handles duplication to the extent that TCP does. It would be straightforward to extend our implementation to handle arbitrary duplica- tion by incorporating digital signatures and timestamps, though we have not yet done so. This extension would also prevent tampering with message contents. FUSE’s ability to handle packet loss is not dependent on using a reliable transport layer, such as TCP. Alternative FUSE implementations could use unreliable transport layers, such as UDP. Using a different transport would present different performance characteristics that many applica- tion developers would want to be aware of.

Our model for node failures is fail-stop. Software fail- ures that are recognized by the application (e.g., miscon- figuration is detected) can be handled by explicitly sig- nalling the FUSE group. FUSE also handles software failures that result in a process exit, such as unhandled exceptions. FUSE does not handle nodes that behave ma- liciously, either due to explicit compromise or due to soft- ware faults that are not appropriately contained.

Malicious nodes can attack FUSE in one of two ways: by dropping legitimate failure notifications or by unneces- sarily generating failure notifications. Dropping a failure notification, and then continuing to generate ping mes- sages for the failed group, can delay the notification indef- initely for certain group members. This violates the FUSE

 

 

notification semantics. Generating unnecessary failure notifications can prevent the use of otherwise functional FUSE groups, thus leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Of course, if the application response to failure notification is to re-attempt the failed operation with a dif- ferent set of nodes, sustaining a DoS attack may be quite difficult.

3.6 Crash Recovery

Our implementation of FUSE does not use stable stor- age, and so crash recovery is trivial. The implementation performs the same actions during crash recovery as during any other initialization.

A recovering node does not know whether a failure no- tification was propagated to other group members. FUSE handles this case and several other corner cases by having nodes actively compare their lists of live FUSE groups as part of liveness checking. We will discuss the details of our implementation more in Section 6, but the effect is that disagreements about the current set of live FUSE groups are detected within one failure timeout interval. Disagreements are resolved by triggering a notification on any groups already considered to have failed by some group member.

An alternative FUSE implementation could use stable storage to attempt to mask brief node crashes. A node recovering from a crash could assume that all the FUSE groups in which it participates are still alive; the active comparison of FUSE IDs would suffice to reliably rec- oncile this node with the rest of the world. Furthermore, there is no compatibility issue: Nodes employing stable storage could co-exist with nodes not employing stable storage without any change to the FUSE semantics. It is still the case that a persistent communication failure on the node recovering from crash would cause all the FUSE groups it participates in to be notified. Applications can also make use of volatile-state FUSE groups to guard state stored in stable storage, but this requires additional application-level complexity.

4 Applications

As part of the Herald [7] project to build a scalable event notification service, we have been exploring the construction of scalable, reliable application-level multi- cast groups using a scalable peer-to-peer overlay network. Grappling with the complexities of implementing failure handling and automatic re-configuration led us to invent a new abstraction for failure notification.

The deciding factor for inventing FUSE was our de- sign of multicast groups. A well-known technique for im- plementing application-level multicast on an overlay is to construct the multicast trees using reverse path forward- ing (e.g., Scribe [37]). One major drawback of this ap- proach is that nodes on an overlay routing path between a subscriber and the root node must forward a potentially large amount of traffic for the multicast group, even if they

have no interest in it. To remove this potential obstacle to deployment, we designed Subscriber/Volunteer (SV) trees [20]. SV trees route content around non-interested parties by establishing separate content-forwarding links among subscribers and volunteers. This leads to two inter- related data structures: a content forwarding tree overlaid on a reverse path forwarding (RPF) tree.

The content-forwarding tree is straightforward to con- struct in the absence of failure. However, repairing the tree without introducing distributed routing cycles proved difficult in the face of arbitrary and possibly simultane- ous node failures, link failures, message loss, and routing changes in the overlay. To manage this complexity, we adopted a simple design pattern: garbage collect out-of- date state using FUSE and retry by establishing a new FUSE group and installing new application-level state. FUSE allowed us to tie together all the distributed state that needed to be garbage collected.

This design pattern drastically reduced the state space that we had to consider and was instrumental in achiev- ing a working SV tree implementation. For example, a single FUSE group ties together the endpoints of a content-forwarding link and all the RPF tree nodes by- passed by that link. Failure notification on this group garbage collects all the relevant state. After failure notifi- cation, the subscriber that requested creation of the now- failed content-forwarding link is responsible for creating a replacement FUSE group and forwarding link. If this subscriber is dead, then no replacement is needed. Indeed, there was a natural choice for the FUSE group creator ev- erywhere we used FUSE, obviating the need for a voting mechanism to manage group creation or re-creation.

As mentioned in Section 3.3, FUSE did not eliminate all race conditions in SV trees, but the remaining ones were trivial to handle. For example, subscribers add ver- sion stamps to each subscription request to prevent late- arriving FUSE notifications from acting on new content- forwarding links.

FUSE also reduced the amount of code required to im- plement SV trees. Without FUSE, we would have had to include a large amount of additional context in each mes- sage to allow the recipient to garbage-collect now-invalid state and we found it difficult to reason about the correct- ness of this non-FUSE alternative design. We also used FUSE in one important non-failure case: when a multicast group participant voluntarily leaves the tree, we explicitly signal the FUSE group that would have been signaled if the node had failed. This causes the appropriate repairs to occur, removing the node from the content-forwarding tree.

Our desire to support large multicast trees does not re- quire that we support individual FUSE groups with a large number of members. We designed SV trees to use a large number of small to medium size FUSE groups, and this determined the scalability requirements for FUSE. For ex- ample, simulating a 2000 subscriber tree on a 16,000 node overlay required an average of 2.9 members per FUSE

 

 

group with a maximum size of 13. We also verified that the maximum and mean FUSE group sizes depend very little on the size of the multicast tree, and increase slowly with the size of the overlay.

4.1 Other Applications

From our experience implementing an event delivery service with FUSE, we believe that many applications built on top of scalable overlay networks can benefit from the use of FUSE. Many of these applications construct a large number of trees, and then monitor parent-child links in these trees using application-level heartbeats. Using FUSE for these application-level heartbeats would allow liveness checking traffic to be shared across all the trees.

Another type of application where FUSE would be useful is a Content Delivery Network (CDN) that repli- cates a large number of documents and pushes updates to them. If the replication topology varies on a per-document basis, this will entail a large number of replication mul- ticast trees. A common strategy for reliability on these trees mirrors the approach discussed above for peer-to- peer applications: heartbeats ensure that each replica site for a given object can track whether it is receiving all up- dates correctly, or is instead somehow disconnected from the tree. FUSE can replace the per-tree heartbeat mes- sages with a more efficient and scalable means of detect- ing when the trees need to be reconfigured due to node or network failures.

Peer-to-peer storage systems such as TotalRecall [4] and Om [45] could also benefit from the efficiencies of us- ing FUSE to implement liveness checking. For example, TotalRecall relies on the overlay for liveness-checking of eager replicas, but must separately implement liveness- checking of lazy replicas. The substitution of FUSE groups would be straightforward. Om implements its own failure detection and timeout scheme using leases; these leases could be replaced by FUSE groups. FUSE would also be a good fit for Om because every replica in Om can regenerate the entire replica set, and therefore should monitor the liveness of all other replicas. This symmet- ric responsibility exactly corresponds to the semantics of FUSE group notifications. Lastly, the potential for false positives using FUSE does not compromise Om’s consistency guarantees; Om’s failure-induced reconfigu- ration protocol is already designed to be robust to failure- detection false positives.

In addition, FUSE may also be useful in some of the application areas targeted by weakly consistent member- ship services. For example, Vogels and Re [44] argue that weakly consistent membership services would ben- efit many Web Services, ranging from scientific comput- ing to federated business activities. FUSE may be a more suitable choice for some of these emerging applications.

A C D

E

B

x: Group(A, D)

y: Group(E, A, D)

yy

x

Figure 2. Two FUSE groups being monitored by overlay pings. The black lines denote end-to-end checking, while dashed gray lines denote active overlay pings.

5 Liveness Checking Topologies

Many different liveness checking topologies can be used to implement FUSE. In this Section, we describe in detail the topology we chose: per-group spanning trees on an overlay network. We then discuss other topologies and their security/scalability tradeoffs.

Our overlay design requires a content-addressable overlay (e.g., DHTs such as CAN, Chord, Pastry, Skip- Net, or Tapestry [25, 34, 36, 39, 46]). Figure 2 depicts an overlay topology with two live FUSE groups, x and y. The spanning tree for FUSE group y contains the group members A, D, and E, and two additional nodes, B and C, that we refer to as delegates. Delegates arise because the FUSE liveness checks are routed along overlay paths between members, and these paths may contain nodes that are not members. If overlay routes change or delegates fail, delegates may be added to or deleted from the live- ness checking tree; this repair process is explained in de- tail in Section 6.

Building liveness checking trees on top of an overlay lets us reuse the liveness checks that the overlay uses to maintain its routing tables. The liveness checking tree for a given FUSE group is the union of the overlay routes be- tween the group creator (the root) and the group members. When multiple FUSE groups have overlapping trees, each overlay ping message monitors all FUSE groups whose liveness checking trees include that overlay link. Figure 2 illustrates this sharing for the FUSE groups x and y.

In the absence of failures, our FUSE implementation requires no additional messages beyond the overlay pings to monitor FUSE groups. Only group setup, teardown, and repair incur per-group costs. This allows one to build systems that require very large numbers of FUSE groups.

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